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THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, FASCISM AND ANTI-FASCISM  
1918-1939 
 
Philip Williamson 
 
The interwar Conservative party provides a challenge for recent historical definitions of 
British anti-fascism.  Distinctions between ‘non-fascism’ and ‘anti-fascism’ and between 
‘passive anti-fascism’ and ‘active anti-fascism’ have been valuable in stimulating debate 
about the character of resistance to fascism, but as Andrzej Olechnowicz has demonstrated 
these categories have been used to give priority to the political left – the Communist party in 
some accounts, the Labour party in others – while overlooking the substantial range of 
‘liberal’ anti-fascism that included numerous Liberals and Conservatives as well as Labour 
figures.
1
 His focus is on cross-party or non-party organisations, and as Helen McCarthy has 
also shown such associations which promoted citizenship and other democratic causes are 
certainly a notable and under-studied feature of interwar British political culture.
2
  The 
Conservative party, however, raises a different range of definitional issues, and not only 
because it formed the main element in the most important cross-party body, the National 
government formed with the main Liberal groups and a few Labour leaders in 1931.   
Notoriously, a number of Conservatives admired fascism in one or more of its British or 
foreign forms, and some historians have taken this as indicative of wider Conservative 
sympathies. Yet the party as a whole was, at the very least, the largest ‘non-fascist’ political 
organisation.  There are several reasons to go further. The Conservative party’s dominance of 
not just most of the political right but also large expanses of the political centre constituted a 
more decisive barrier to the growth of British fascism than the explicitly anti-fascist bodies of 
the political left.
3
  As many of its actions and statements had anti-fascist effects, the party 
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might well be categorised as ‘passive anti-fascist’.4  Further, from 1933 leading 
Conservatives mounted an ideological and moral resistance towards dictatorship and 
totalitarianism, which should certainly be classified as ‘active anti-fascism’. 
In considering the interwar Conservative party’s attitudes towards fascism and more 
especially British fascists, the ‘party’ is taken here to mean its leaders, its ministers in 
Conservative and coalition governments, the strategists and publicists in its national 
organisation, Conservative MPs, those Conservative peers significant in national politics,
5
 
and regional and local officials – rather than the penumbra of journalists and other publicists 
who expressed various Conservative opinions, but very few of whom were important for 
Conservative politicians.  As a necessary preliminary, the first section of this essay will 
comment on suggestions that the Conservative party contained a significant pro-fascist 
element, and that decisions by the party’s leaders in the mid 1930s were affected by fears of 
losing support to the British fascist groups.  It will then be argued that the Conservative party 
provided a considerable indirect resistance to fascism.  While pursuing its main political 
concerns, the party had the largest role in preserving stable government, maintaining 
confidence in existing institutions, and containing challenges from the far left which might 
have provoked greater interest in fascism.  At the same time it accommodated or emasculated 
various radical ‘right’ groups which might conceivably have defected to fascism.  The third 
section will consider Conservative anti-fascism in the direct sense, the expression of 
arguments and values in opposition to British and international fascism. 
 
Conservatives and fascists 
It is now well established that British fascism was not simply a foreign import but had 
substantial native sources, chiefly the imperial-protectionist, radical right and diehard 
movements within or associated with the Edwardian Unionist alliance, as re-energised by 
certain effects of the Great War and early post-war political, economic and imperial 
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dislocations.  In some significant respects interwar British fascist groups and elements of the 
Conservative ‘right’ shared a common ancestry.6  Wider points of apparent similarity are 
obvious: anti-communism, anti-socialism, and opposition to direct-action trade unionism 
were shared by all Conservatives.  Many Conservatives were concerned about the effects of 
the extended parliamentary franchise created in 1918 and 1928.  Some wanted institutional 
reform of Parliament, and some were interested in ‘corporate’ economic ideas.  Some had 
anti-semitic prejudices.  In the 1930s many wished to prevent another European war and were 
prepared to be conciliatory toward the Italian fascist and German Nazi governments, and 
some wanted support for Franco’s Nationalists.  But such views are not adequately 
understood if the Conservative party is conceived of as a ‘party of the right’, with its 
members located in neat ranks on a political spectrum which blended into fascism – and so 
liable to tumble into wholesale adoption of fascist ideas and methods.   
The Conservative party was a ‘liberal’ party.  It was integral to a parliamentary and 
electoral party system, sharing substantial ideological ground with the Liberal and Labour 
parties, and was neither a unitary body nor a simple span along a spectrum but a cluster of 
groups gathered together for largely contingent reasons.  Each group expressed a mixture of 
interests and opinions drawn from various sources and which commonly pointed in different 
directions; the groups themselves shifted in composition and concern according to 
circumstances.
7
  Just as Mosley’s fascism derived some ideas from Conservatives and some 
from socialists, so the varieties of Conservatism did not form coherent ideological packages: 
it was perfectly possible to be interested in or to admire some fascist notions yet be 
indifferent or hostile towards some or most of the other fascist ideas and methods.  This was 
not just true among Conservative diehards or imperial protectionists, but also some 
progressive Conservative ‘modernisers’.  For example, during the furore after the fascist rally 
at Olympia in June 1934, the Conservative junior minister R.A. Butler privately expressed 
interest in the ‘Corporative State’ and a hope that the presence of the British Union of 
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Fascists (BUF) would stimulate Parliament to give greater attention to ‘the conception of 
modern organisation’.  He nevertheless ‘sought to preserve our liberties and to avoid copying 
foreign models and regimenting our nation’.  Such qualifications were characteristic of 
Conservative observations on fascism.  Butler added that all he and other modernisers such as 
Walter Elliot, the Minister of Agriculture, wanted was ‘to organise our industry within a 
framework of ordered liberty’, and that it was wrong to assume that ‘those of us who talk 
about reorganisation and planning or the corporative state necessarily believe in Fascism’.8   
 It is not surprising that similarities existed between some fascist ideas and the 
opinions of some Conservatives.  It is certainly also the case that various Conservative or 
Conservative-minded publicists, ‘society’ figures and local activists embraced ‘hard right’ 
views or were culpably naïve about fascist movements and governments.  Some publications 
(those of the Britons, The English Review, The Saturday Review) and some writers (Jerrold, 
Petrie, Webster, Yeats-Brown, Ludovici, Bryant) have attracted particular attention.
9
  But 
while these groups assist understanding of British fascism, they establish little about 
Conservative politics: they were far from representative of the party as a whole, and the 
writers had no influence with Conservative politicians.
10
   
Rather, it is notable how few Conservative politicians and organisers were attracted by 
fascism as such and were associated with fascist or pro-fascist groups; and how very rarely 
references to British fascist groups or to bodies favourable towards foreign fascist movements 
appear in Conservative party records and in the letters, diaries and speeches of Conservative 
politicians.   
Martin Pugh has argued that ‘so far from fascism being repudiated and marginalised 
by the conventional politicians, there was a flourishing traffic in ideas and in personnel 
between fascism and the Conservative Right throughout the inter-war period’.11  
Accordingly, in the mid 1920s ‘a number of mainstream politicians took the British Fascists 
very seriously and sympathetically’.  However, by his account just four backbench MPs had 
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some association with British Fascist (BF) meetings.  Several more found BF members useful 
as stewards for their own meetings, including those for an unofficial 1926 campaign ‘to 
protest against Soviet interference in British affairs’.12  Apparently more impressive was the 
earlier willingness of Joynson-Hicks, the Home Secretary, to include them with members of 
other ‘patriotic’ volunteer organisations as recruits for emergency arrangements during a 
national strike; as Richard Maguire also comments, this indicates some level of political 
acceptability.
13
  Yet as Richard Thurlow, Thomas Linehan and others have shown, until the 
late 1920s the British Fascists were fascists in name only, and not a distinct party but an anti-
communist and anti-direct-action organisation committed by their leaders to uphold the 
established constitution and to vote Conservative.  Their distinctive feature was precisely 
preparation for supporting the existing state in a civil emergency – for which purpose they 
even offered their services to the 1924 Labour government.
14
  Even so Joynson-Hicks, often 
considered a right-wing ‘diehard’, insisted that they could participate in the emergency strike 
organisation only as individuals, refusing to recognise the BF as a corporate body so long as 
they maintained a ‘semi-military organisation’ and claimed to act ‘in any sense in 
contradistinction to the work of the Executive Government’.15 
 None of this amounted to ‘ideological’ approval for fascism; nor do such attitudes 
towards nominal ‘fascists’ in the 1920s necessarily indicate sympathy for genuine fascists in 
the 1930s.  On Pugh’s evidence, perhaps a handful of Conservative MPs had meaningful 
associations with both the BF and BUF.  But if John Gilmour as Scottish Secretary in 1924 
regarded the BF as potentially helpful in maintaining law and order in the event of an 
emergency, as Home Secretary in 1934 he pressed for legislation to curb the BUF’s para-
military organisation as ‘in principle inconsistent with our free institutions’, as well as ‘in 
practice … the source of repeated and serious outbreaks of disorder’.16  Of over 450 
Conservative MPs in 1934 and over 380 after the 1935 election, Lymington and two others 
were members of the fascist English Mistery, and according to Thurlow’s review of evidence 
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from security service and police surveillance three other MPs showed interest in the BUF.
17
  
Pugh’s more expansive interpretation – including membership of the January Club, a 
discussion network established by Mosley to draw non-fascists into a presentation of fascism 
in a ‘respectable’ conservative form18 – produces around 20 MPs in some sense favourable 
towards the BUF.  Much of his argument turns on the House of Commons debate in June 
1934 on the BUF’s Olympia meeting, from which he classifies eight mostly Conservative 
MPs as defending the methods of fascist stewards in silencing protestors.  This number is 
contested – Jon Lawrence proposes four – but what is more doubtful is Pugh’s description of 
these eight as ‘pro-fascists’, who ‘defended or justified the movement’ and showed ‘genuine 
appreciation of Mosley and his organisation’.   In reality just two suggested such views: the 
rest explicitly denied support or sympathy for the BUF’s politics, or regretted that it was 
winning support.
19
  Those MPs and peers who did sympathise with the BUF – or like Thomas 
Moore declared that there was no ‘fundamental difference of outlook between the Blackshirts 
and … Conservatives’ – mostly misunderstood the character of fascism, and retreated after 
Olympia and the publicity given to Hitler’s murderous political purges in late June.20  They 
were a minority even among the Conservative right; in contrast the great diehard cause of the 
mid 1930s and the dominant issue for Conservatives during the month of Olympia – 
resistance to Indian constitutional reform – had support from about 80 MPs.21  No prominent 
diehard politicians were associated with the BUF or the January Club, not even Page Croft, 
the leader of a purported precursor of British fascism, the National Party of 1917-21.   
Those Conservative politicians who drew attention to the BUF’s growing membership 
during early 1934 did so not from any desire for closer relations with the movement nor from 
anxiety about defections to fascism, but as ammunition in an argument within the 
Conservative party – for changes in party policy and for removal of non-Conservative leaders 
of the National government.
22
  Use of the BUF as an instrument within Conservative politics 
was also the purpose of its chief newspaper supporter, Rothermere, who for this reason 
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instructed his journalists to use the term ‘blackshirt’ instead of ‘fascist’.23  The BUF certainly 
did not provide, as Pugh asserts,  ‘the most compelling and coherent alternative’ to the 
National government: for its Conservative critics, the ‘obvious alternative’ was an 
independent Conservative government.  Nor did the BUF constitute a ‘dire electoral 
challenge’ to Conservatives, or cause the Cabinet to postpone public-order legislation from 
1934 until after the 1935 general election.
24
  The substantial increase in BUF membership 
from January 1934 before its collapse from July belongs less to the history of fascism than to 
the history of newspapers.  It was an ephemeral ‘bubble’ generated by short-lived support 
from Rothermere’s newspapers, comparable with Rothermere’s Anti-Waste League in 1921-
22 and United Empire Party of 1930-31, and Beaverbrook’s Empire Crusade of 1929-31.  
Indeed, the BUF secured fewer members than the Empire Crusade (some 200,000 members; 
the BUF 50,000) and had much less impact than any of these earlier newspaper movements 
on Conservative politics.
25
  In contrast to the anxieties these movements caused for party 
managers, the BUF barely registers at all in organisational records.  The Primrose League 
noted ‘a certain amount of interest’ in the Fascists.26  In Lancashire, where the BUF 
supposedly posed a particular electoral threat, the Conservative party’s provincial council 
made no reference to it.  The northern provincial area wanted ‘immediate steps to combat’ the 
‘menaces’ of both Fascist and Communist doctrines.27  As for Conservative constituency 
associations, Stuart Ball’s comprehensive study of their surviving records has found hardly 
any mention at all of the BUF, and no evidence of significant concern.
28
  Insofar as some 
Conservative politicians did not rule out fascism entirely in the mid 1930s, the concern was 
not with the current or any seriously expected political situation. Rather, during a period 
when Cripps’s Socialist League advocated the seizure of ‘emergency powers’, it arose from 
speculation about an alternative, conceivable, but very undesired future: what might be 
preferred if parliamentary government were to collapse after a period of calamitous ‘socialist’ 
government.  For Conservatives, in some ultimate choice between communist dictatorship 
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and fascist dictatorship, fascism could be the lesser evil – but nonetheless still an evil.29  Such 
remarks were not ‘pro-fascist’.  
Rather more Conservative politicians expressed admiration or support for foreign 
fascist regimes or movements.  Richard Griffiths and others have identified at most 50 MPs 
who in some degree or at some time were ‘enthusiasts’ for Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany or 
Franco’s Nationalists.  Not all of these MPs admired all of these governments or movements, 
some actively disliked one or the other, and very few also supported any British fascist 
group.
30
  As is well established, what most of these Conservatives admired was precisely 
foreign fascism – as appropriate for other countries, a barrier to Soviet Communism, or 
(supposed) preserver of European peace – not as a model or import for Britain itself.  So for 
instance Churchill, while in Rome speaking as Romans expected, declared in 1927 that if he 
had been Italian he would have been ‘whole-heartedly with you … in your triumphant 
struggle against the bestial appetites and passions of Leninism’, but that ‘in England we have 
our own way of doing things’.31  Ten years later Lennox-Boyd, apparently a strong case of a 
Conservative ‘pro-fascist’, stated that ‘he viewed with horror the establishing in England of 
any system remotely resembling the dictatorships of the continent’.32  Lennox-Boyd was one 
of 20 MPs belonging to bodies which supported Nationalist Spain, while around 25 
Conservative MPs and a similar number of Conservative peers (most prominently Lords 
Mount Temple and Londonderry) were members of the Anglo-German Fellowship.
33
  Again 
these were just a small proportion of parliamentary Conservatives; taking another measure, 
‘there were more Jewish Members of Parliament on the Conservative benches than members 
of the Anglo-German Fellowship’.34  Nor did such admiration for foreign fascism influence 
the policy-makers.  Government ministers and their large numbers of Conservative supporters 
had their own policy reasons (international, strategic, economic and financial) to avoid war 
with Italy or in Spain, and to be conciliatory towards Germany.  ‘Appeasement’ was certainly 
not identical with ‘pro-fascism’ or ‘pro-Nazism’.35 Conservative membership of the Anglo-
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German Fellowship fell as the nature of Nazi government became evident with the Austrian 
and Czechoslovakian crises and then Kristallnacht.  Mosley’s ‘British Union’ peace 
campaign was entirely irrelevant for government policy-makers and Conservative politics.
36
  
In mid 1939 perhaps just a dozen MPs were involved for various reasons with the anti-
semitic and ‘patriotic’ Right Club.37  
Historians of British fascists and pro-fascists tend to slide into stating that ‘many’ 
Conservatives were interested in fascist groups or fascism, where ‘some’ would be a more 
accurate term, and for Conservative politicians ‘a few’ and usually ‘very few’.  This was 
plain to the party’s Liberal and Labour opponents.  Lloyd George occasionally accused the 
Conservative party of fascist leanings during his anti-Conservative phases following the 
overthrow of his Coalition government and into the later 1920s;
38
 so too did Stafford Cripps 
during his anti-capitalist Socialist League phase in 1934-35.
39
  A few further cases might be 
found, but such language was the obvious ‘negative stereotyping’ of party-political rhetoric.  
Rather more interesting were suggestions by some Labour leaders during the height of 
appeasement in 1938 that Neville Chamberlain was sympathetic towards the fascist 
dictatorships.
40
  What is again striking is the rarity of such statements: most Liberal and 
Labour politicians did not mistake the views of a few on the Conservative right for those of 
Conservatives in general, and even when arguing party-political points hardly any 
considered, and none found, that the charge of pro-fascism could be made to stick on the 
Conservative party or the National government. 
 
Conservative government and the National government 
The two most general explanations offered for the marginalisation of British fascism are 
‘political culture’ and ‘economic conditions’.  For historians who regard Conservative ‘pro-
fascism’ as politically substantial, the first seems just something received, amorphous and 
frail.  This makes the second – the relative mildness of the international depression in Britain, 
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and economic revival from 1933 – the decisive element, but also something independent, 
almost a force of nature.
41
  Yet ‘political culture’ is constantly renewed as circumstances 
change.  The transformation in political conditions and in the conventional party system from 
1914 into the 1930s, particularly with the Liberal party’s disintegration and the Labour 
party’s arrival as a major force, brought new vigour to political argument, values and 
assumptions.  It also brought changes in economic and social policies.  ‘Politics’ and the 
‘economy’ were not separate spheres, and in interwar Britain ‘political culture’ contributed to 
policies and arguments which affected the character and the public perception of ‘economic 
conditions’.  
 The Conservative party had always been fundamentally a constitutional party.  British 
politics had for centuries turned upon constitutional issues: not only the parliamentary parties 
but even most extra-parliamentary radicals admired the established constitution and espoused 
a version of British history in which the rule of law and representative institutions had 
secured and safeguarded popular liberties, religious toleration, social cohesion, political 
stability, national prosperity, and superiority over other nations.  This so-called ‘Whig’ 
interpretation of history was at the core of ‘national identity’ and patriotic loyalties, shaped 
and re-shaped over generations of contrast to Roman Catholic, Spanish, Bourbon, 
Napoleonic, Tsarist and Prussian ‘despotisms’.  Constitutional ideology united the main 
political parties more than any issue divided them, with the effect that disagreements were 
tolerated and in time accommodated, while extra-parliamentary radicals sought less to 
destroy existing institutions and procedures than to modify and gain access into them.  The 
primary distinction between the two main parties was that Whigs and then Liberals were the 
party of constitutional reform while Tories, Conservatives and Unionists were successively 
the party of constitutional defence.  Even the Labour party, while seeking priority for social 
and economic issues, accepted the existing institutional structure and procedures: it assumed 
parliamentary democracy as the foundation for democratic socialism.
42
 Such deep ideological 
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roots carried greater influence from being integral to the hard realities of historical 
experience, political self-interest and practical success.  Parliamentary methods were the 
means to power, and provided party leaders with claims to authority over followers and to 
support from voters; for radicals and socialists they supplied the means for reform, for 
Conservatives and Unionists the means to preserve the social and economic structure, and for 
all the means to avoid a breakdown in political order in which no cause would escape 
damage.
43
   
 When in November 1917 Bonar Law as Unionist leader reviewed the prospects of a 
new post-war political world with an extended parliamentary electorate and a powerful, 
socialist Labour movement, he declared that ‘our Party on the old lines will have no future in 
the life of this Country’.44  He did not conclude that the party should turn to the radical right 
and resist democracy and reform; rather, the Unionist leadership allied with the pre-war 
progressive radical Lloyd George, expanded their party’s electoral organisation and accepted 
policies of social reconstruction.  Similarly when post-war inflation, industrial militancy and 
imperial pressures generated support for ‘middle-class’, Rothermere-led and diehard 
‘revolts’,45 the party leaders did not acquiesce in any protests against ‘democracy’ but treated 
these revolts as a disagreement about the Lloyd George Coalition government’s ability to 
appeal to ‘central’ opinion.   The influence of the radical right dissolved with the replacement 
of the Coalition by a Conservative government in October 1922, and was not revived even 
when this government lost a general election in circumstances which allowed socialists to 
form a government in January 1924.   
Conservative leaders had two main assumptions about how best to defend the 
established order. One was to seek a ‘political’ balance in economic and social policies.  
From 1920 Conservative leaders helped establish a ‘deflationary’ budgetary and monetary 
regime which stabilised the financial system and reassured property owners and the rentier 
and salaried ‘middle classes’.46  But they also maintained the unemployment insurance 
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system and made only limited attempts to restrain its rising cost.  In 1923 Baldwin proposed 
protection as a solution to unemployment and as an electoral appeal to the working 
population, and when that failed the Conservative leaders replaced it with a social reform 
programme on a broadly ‘new liberal’ basis.  In 1925 Baldwin resisted proposals to reduce 
direct taxes by means of social-service cuts as ‘a most one-sided policy’ which would seem 
‘an attack upon the working man’ and undermine the aim of ‘combating Socialism’.47  That 
early post-war economic conditions did not produce large-scale alienation from the 
established party and parliamentary system owed much to Conservative policy decisions. 
 The other means of defence was to win elections.  At some level most Conservatives, 
including most of their leaders, feared the effects of democracy, but the party’s reaction was 
to make intensive efforts to ensure that parliamentary democracy worked to its own 
advantage.  This involved not just acceptance of the implications of a mass electorate from 
1918, but taking the initiative in extending the franchise further in 1928.  It included 
continued adherence to the conventions, restraints, frustrations and occasional defeats of the 
party-political struggle, even though this meant acceptance of the Labour party as the main, 
and legitimate, opponent.  Labour was treated largely and usually – though not wholly and 
always – as an ordinary electoral and parliamentary rival.  No extraordinary measures were 
taken in 1924 and 1929 to obstruct the formation of minority Labour governments, with the 
purpose of encouraging its leaders’ acceptance of existing institutions and political 
conventions, and their ability to restrain or defeat more extreme types of socialists.  But this 
strategy had further implications.  In order to defeat Labour at elections or prevent it forming 
a majority government, the party had to be spread as widely as possible, across a very broad 
range of opinions, seeking ‘to tie together the moral, industrial, agrarian, libertarian, Anglican 
and nonconformist bodies of resistance’ to socialism.48  This also meant a determination to 
ignore or resist disaffected Conservative diehards, whose aims would be self-defeating 
because fatally narrowing the party’s appeal.  From 1924 the strategy involved taking every 
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opportunity to win over Liberal voters, to divide the Liberal party and to capture Liberal 
politicians.  In 1931 it involved a repeat of 1918, agreeing to serve in another coalition under 
the leading progressive politician, even though MacDonald had been the Labour prime 
minister.  The creation and perpetuation of this National government is crucial for 
understanding the weakness of the British Union of Fascists. 
 It is often observed that British fascism’s great opportunity came during the first half 
of 1934, with the high point of the BUF’s membership and national prominence.  But if there 
was any ‘fascist moment’ in Britain this came earlier, before the BUF’s creation, indeed in 
the circumstances which explain Mosley’s decision to form the BUF.  From late 1929 to 
autumn 1931 there was a general and deepening sense of national crisis, with no obvious 
solution – just that combination of severe economic, financial and political difficulties, and 
disillusionment with established politics that Mosley later expected would provide the BUF 
with its opportunity for power.  With considerable political intelligence, during those two 
years he anticipated much of what would happen in national politics from August 1931.  With 
the onset of the world depression, there was much discussion of radical changes in economic 
policy: hence Mosley’s successive economic programmes while a Labour minister and MP 
from February to December 1930.  With all the main parties divided, there was speculation 
about reconstruction of the party system: hence Mosley’s departure from the Labour party in 
March 1931, to form the New party.  With a weak government without a parliamentary 
majority, there was concern that the restoration of strong government might require major 
institutional changes: hence Mosley’s proposals for a small cabinet, armed with special 
‘general powers’ to legislate without Parliament and involving ‘a certain surrender of 
political liberty’.  In these years Mosley commanded serious and impressive political 
attention, listened to with interest and respect not just by Rothermere but by Beaverbrook, the 
Liberals Lloyd George, Sinclair and Keynes, and the Conservatives Churchill, Lloyd and a 
younger generation of Elliot, Oliver Stanley, Boothby, Macmillan, Moore-Brabazon, 
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O’Connor and Mond.  One example of a widespread sense of crisis is that in early 1930 some 
of these younger Conservatives indulged in speculative conversation with Mosley (then still a 
Labour minister) on ‘the decay of democracy and parliamentarianism’ and (with pre-Hitler 
innocence) ‘whether it would be well to have a fascist coup’.49  As Mosley intended, his New 
party gave him weight during mid 1931 in some proposals for a coalition or cross-party 
opposition.  But much of what he wanted in terms of party re-alignment was pre-empted in 
August with the formation by the Conservative, Liberal and some Labour leaders of an 
emergency National government. Even then Mosley retained some chance of power: at a 
difficult moment when the new government might have disintegrated and left the 
Conservative party to fight an election alone in risky circumstances, Neville Chamberlain 
very briefly entertained a Mosley overture for an electoral alliance.
50
   
 What destroyed Mosley’s prospects and electorally obliterated the New party was the 
Conservative leadership’s readiness to remain within the coalition government and turn it into 
a great anti-socialist alliance for a general election in October 1931, at which the Labour 
party was crushed.  With the coalition winning a parliamentary majority of 500, there was 
now a strong government which for the foreseeable future was unassailable by the socialist 
left and created an assurance of political stability and civil order.  Although the emergency 
National government had failed to prevent devaluation of sterling, it took measures to restore 
‘sound finance’ and financial confidence and so ensure the security of the banks, rents, 
investments, and savings.  Despite controversial reductions in government spending including 
unemployment payments which provoked protest demonstrations in the early 1930s, it was 
even more conscious than governments after 1920 of a need to minimise social and political 
alienation: by raising direct taxes it had taken care to create and publicise some degree of 
‘equal sacrifices’ and to maintain the unemployment insurance system close to pre-
depression levels, in terms of real prices.  The elected National government introduced long-
desired Conservative policies, above all protection and imperial preference, yet also what had 
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earlier been regarded as radical monetary measures to boost recovery: a managed currency, 
managed exchange rates and ‘cheap money’.  These policies further enabled opportunities to 
promote ‘corporative’ industrial and agricultural re-organisation.51  The National government 
thus had a substantial effect in easing ‘economic conditions’, mitigating the worst effects of 
the international depression and the worst anxieties about the domestic depression.  From 
1932 it could claim credit for economic recovery and, for a substantial part of the population, 
a ‘dawn of affluence’.52 
Consequently the establishment of the National government was not just a disaster for 
the New party; it also destroyed any prospects of fascism becoming a force in national 
politics.  It removed its political justifications; it introduced economic policies similar to 
those which Mosley and his economist and Conservative friends had wanted in 1930-31; and 
it cost him potential Conservative allies, with Elliot and Stanley becoming ministers in the 
National government while the rest understood that it provided the best means of achieving 
their aims.  If, as is often stated, Mosley was unfortunate in his timing, this was not because 
the BUF’s creation in October 1932 occurred as the economy began to revive, but because he 
had taken the plunge in the winter of 1930-31 and so was left out of the party re-alignments 
during autumn 1931. 
For Mosley, formation of the BUF was an act of desperation: a response to political 
exclusion, a bid to regain public prominence and a gamble on a political crash.  What he 
needed was a more severe version of the 1930-31 crisis, forcing not just another re-alignment 
of parties and policies but a breakdown in the parliamentary regime.  This was never likely 
under the National government.  Certainly the government experienced difficulties and by-
election setbacks in 1933-5; certainly there were Conservative critics, a few of whom 
expressed doubts not just about the government but about parliamentary democracy.  But a 
sense of historical proportion is needed.  These problems and complaints were less serious 
than those of 1920-2 and 1929-31, and were well within the capabilities of experienced 
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government and party management.  Of the various critics of the National government in 
1934, the BUF was ‘the least significant’.53  Most Conservative diehards, when not pre-
occupied with the India issue, were exercised by German rearmament and pressure on the 
government to undertake British rearmament, as it began to do in July 1934.  Their criticisms 
and those of other Conservatives were more easily contained because one alternative to the 
National government was a Labour party which from autumn 1931 had moved to the left, 
become committed to socialist planning and pacifism, and had members flirting with the 
Communist party.  If the largest political change the sternest Conservative critics wanted was 
reversion to a purely Conservative government, in contrast the best-supported Conservative 
statement during 1934 (in the week after Olympia) was from over 100 backbench MPs 
calling for continuation of the National government.
54
  Government and Conservative party 
concerns with ‘public opinion’ and electoral prospects centred not just on the Labour party 
but even more on the possible loss of support from ‘liberal opinion’.  This, and not anxiety 
about Conservative ‘pro-fascist’ opinion, was the party context for the postponement of 
public-order legislation during 1934.  The political and official ‘establishment’ was hostile 
towards the BUF’s politics and methods, but Gilmour’s efforts to restrict its activities faced 
two obstacles.  The first was his officials’ difficulties over legal definitions and their ‘liberal’ 
concern to preserve civil liberties.  The second, related to this delicate civil liberties aspect, 
was a Cabinet desire for all-party agreement, which ministers could not obtain; in other 
words, the political obstruction came not from concern about Conservative opinion but from 
Labour and opposition Liberal leaders.
55
  Nevertheless the extent of Conservative as well as 
Labour and Liberal criticism after Olympia forced a shift in BUF methods;
56
 and this, 
together with the bursting of its membership bubble, made legislation seem unnecessary.  The 
BUF now almost entirely disappeared as a political concern.  The strategy, issues and date for 
the November 1935 election were related to calculations about the Labour party and liberal 
opinion and to issues in foreign and defence policies – not at all to concerns about the BUF.  
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The introduction and passage of the Public Order Act some twelve months later arose from 
renewed Cabinet determination to deal with BUF incitement of disorder after riots in the East 
End of London, and from the belated agreement of Labour and opposition Liberal leaders to 
co-operate.  Mosley’s hope that the BUF would gain new impetus from the issue of Edward 
VIII’s proposed marriage was another instance of desperation, not least because the 
opposition parties firmly supported the government on a primary element of constitutional 
principle, that the monarch must accept ministerial advice.
57
 
The character of the National government is central to understanding British anti-
fascism.  It re-stabilised government, party politics, the financial system and economic 
policies; it also upheld the British parliamentary system’s inherent resistance to non-
parliamentary movements.  Although Conservative-dominated, and often unthinkingly 
presented by historians as a ‘Conservative’ government, it was certainly not reactionary or 
‘right-wing’.  Indeed, an attraction for Conservative leaders was that by diluting the influence 
of the  ‘diehards’, it increased their range of policy options, most clearly in enabling them to 
pursue the tri-partisan reform process for Indian government.  The government’s 
Conservative leaders carefully preserved its claims to retain wide ‘national’ and ‘liberal’ 
support, and regarded its Liberal National and National Labour members as important.  
Because its leaders upheld liberal values and so tolerated the expression of illiberal opinions 
(fascist, communist and others), this did not mean that they approved of these opinions.  
Because prevention of another terrible war seemed to require conciliation of foreign fascist 
regimes, this did not mean an absence of ideological resistance to fascism as well as 
communism. 
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The Conservative party and anti-fascism 
Conservative party attitudes towards fascism cannot be understood in relation to fascist 
parties and governments alone; nor were they just integral to its character as a liberal 
parliamentary party.  They were also affected by the dynamics of the party system – by the 
stances it adopted towards its main opponents, the independent Liberals and more particularly 
the Labour party.  
While the main Conservative strategy for restraining the political left was to 
encourage the Labour party’s development as an ordinary parliamentary party, Conservative 
leaders still wanted not just to defeat the Labour movement but to discredit and disarm its 
challenges to the established order.  In some senses and at most times it was presented as 
acceptable and even admirable; in other senses and for some periods as doctrinaire and 
disruptive – as a danger to democracy.  From the early 1920s this became a central feature of 
Conservative party strategy and identity. Its official publicists and its leaders, especially 
Baldwin, revived and extended their party’s role as defender of the constitution.  They 
presented it as the upholder not just of established institutions but of the whole cross-party 
‘Whig’ constitutionalist ideology, and therefore with defence of democracy and as the 
guarantee equally of stability, freedom and progress, of ‘ordered liberty’.  By merging the 
historical functions of the Conservative and Liberal parties, the aim was to act as the 
ostensibly non-partisan champion of the ‘constitutional classes’, rallying both Conservative 
and liberal opinion against the various challenges from the Labour movement.
58
  In one 
voice, parliamentary democracy was celebrated as robust and supplying all reasonable 
resources for a responsible Labour party; in another voice it was described as fragile and 
vulnerable to the dangerous purposes of irresponsible socialists.  The new democracy was 
‘immature’, an ‘experiment’ balanced between anarchy on one side and tyranny on the other: 
to maintain it would require restraint, exertion, vigilance, dedicated service, good citizenship 
and political education – and, explicitly, resistance to the undemocratic tendencies and 
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elements inherent in the Labour party.  This was a powerful political and discursive strategy.  
In the mid 1920s the heckling or ‘rowdyism’ of Labour supporters at Conservative elections 
meetings was presented as a Labour party threat to free speech and constitutional 
government.
59
  At the 1924 election the Labour government was attacked with considerable 
effect as soft towards Soviet ‘bolshevism’.  During the trade union troubles of 1925-6, the 
Conservative government changed the argument into a constitutional issue: the General 
Strike was ‘a challenge to Parliament, and … the road to anarchy and ruin’.  At the 1931 
election the National government was said to be preserving ‘democracy’ and ‘parliamentary 
government’.  From 1933 to 1935 the Socialist League’s calls for special emergency powers 
were used remorselessly to assert that the whole Labour party aimed to establish a ‘Socialist 
Dictatorship’.60  
 This strategy towards the Labour movement reinforced the Conservative party’s 
opposition to fascism: taking the constitutional and democratic high ground against the first 
required that this should also be sustained against the second.  This explains Joynson-Hicks’s 
very strict line in 1926 against British Fascists who were not actually fascist.  It also 
contributed to Conservative ‘active anti-fascism’ in the 1930s.  This is not to say that 
Conservative leaders and producers of party literature made extended criticisms of the BUF.  
In part this was deliberate strategy: denying attention and significance to Mosley’s party, 
which ministers and party officials also recommended to newspapers and the BBC,
61
 was 
politically crippling.   Mosley certainly regarded poor media publicity as a considerable 
handicap.  In part it arose from an accurate assessment of its prospects: as Baldwin stated 
after Olympia, ‘Mosley won’t come to any good, and we need not bother about him’.62  
Nevertheless Baldwin did make a lengthy public comment on the BUF a few days later, 
giving a once-and-only admonition to prospective Conservative defectors.  Pugh has 
remarked that this contained an ‘inept’ concession that fascism and Conservatism were on the 
same spectrum: ‘the policy of Fascism is what you may call an Ultramontane Conservatism. 
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It takes many of the tenets of our own party and pushes them to a conclusion which, if given 
effect to, would … be disastrous to our country’.  Yet the meaning is clear – ‘ultramontane’ 
in the sense of an unacceptable and disastrous absolutism – and the decisive drawing of the 
line came in Baldwin’s following sentence: British fascism had ‘taken from the Continent 
one thing which is completely alien to the Englishman, and that is a desire ultimately, 
common to the Communists, to suppress opposition and to be able to proceed by dictatorial 
methods’.63  Such statements recur in Conservative party literature and guidance for speakers:  
in the BUF’s meaning the corporate state was ‘Dictatorship, pure and simple’, and this meant 
an end to justice, the rule of law and the freedoms of speech, the press, public association, 
collective bargaining and democratic government.
64
  
The main reason why the BUF received limited specific criticism was that  
Conservative leaders and party publicists subsumed it within a more fundamental defence of 
democracy against all forms of dictatorship, authoritarianism or totalitarianism.  Most 
evidently, this became Baldwin’s characteristic rhetorical strategy, merging rejection of 
fascism and nazism with attacks on communism and socialism, and treating them all as the 
common enemy.
65
  The approach had particular purposes in domestic party politics.  From 
1933 to 1935 it supplied a new justification for continuation of the National government, both 
against a possible Conservative diehard rebellion over the India bill and against a Labour 
party revival: ‘if you have a weak or feeble Government … you may see a slide here … to 
some form of Bolshevism or Fascism’.  From 1934 it assisted the delicate task of justifying 
rearmament in the face of the Labour and Liberal oppositions and considerable popular 
attachment to peace.  When Baldwin was urged to impress on the electorate the possibility of 
another European war, he re-defined the issue in ideological terms: ‘he would not put it that 
way. I would say that we are the only defenders left of liberty in a world of Fascists’.66  When 
concern about Hitler’s and Mussolini’s ambitions increased during 1935 and made still 
greater rearmament desirable, he modified the strategy in order to seek still wider national co-
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operation.  He now switched to embracing the Labour movement within the constitutional 
order: it was a ‘great stabilizing influence’ and a ‘bulwark of popular liberty’ against 
communism and fascism.  But if party and ministerial purposes played a substantial part, 
these were based upon genuine ideological opposition to fascism as well as communism, 
expressed in many of Baldwin’s speeches and broadcasts and in much party literature.  
Fascism, like communism, was concerned with the eradication of individuality and creation 
of a ‘mass mind’, with the suppression of freedom and imposition of ‘slavery’: soon ‘from 
the Rhine to the Pacific there will be … millions who have been trained to be either 
Bolshevik robots or Nazi robots’.  Britain, he declared in a broadcast in March 1934, was ‘the 
last stronghold of freedom, standing like a rock in a tide that is threatening to submerge the 
world’.  Accordingly, British public figures had a duty not just to their own people but to the 
whole world to maintain ‘the torch of freedom’.  Baldwin’s arguments were not only political 
but spiritual, the evocation of moral and religious resistance to amoral and atheistic doctrines: 
‘the recognition of the dignity of man and of his individuality …  as a child of God … is the 
unbridgeable gulf between democracy and the isms’.  So frequent and prominent was defence 
of ‘ordered liberty’ as a theme in Baldwin’s public statements that he became a leading 
international spokesman against fascism and communism, invited twice to North America 
during 1939 to speak on the causes of freedom and democracy. 
Presenting ‘dictatorship’ as the ideological enemy expressed a belief that the political 
extremes were linked: that fascism and communism bred upon each other, that more 
communist activity would provoke more fascist activity and vice versa, degenerating into 
class war, civil breakdown and ending, whichever prevailed, in the destruction of democracy 
and liberty.  Attacking dictatorship in generic terms also had the effect of reducing foreign 
policy complications.  Conservative leaders not only understood the character of Nazism, but 
also had some knowledge of its practical effects.  One instance is that in 1935 Baldwin, 
Churchill, Cecil, Halifax and Londonderry as university vice-chancellors appealed on behalf 
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of the Academic Assistance Council, assisting Jewish scholars fleeing from Germany; 
another is the establishment after Kristallnacht of the Lord Baldwin Fund for Refugees.  But 
given the horrors of modern warfare, National government ministers did not want ideological 
and moral resistance to become a diplomatic and military crusade; and in seeking conciliation 
with Italy and Germany yet judging Mussolini and Hitler to be dangerously irresponsible and 
volatile, they sought to minimise provocations.  The Cabinet twice accepted that Italian 
fascist and German Nazi party organisations active in Britain should be proscribed, but then 
agreed that action was ‘inopportune’ while agreements were being sought with their 
governments.
67
  During 1938 the Cabinet urged newspapers to avoid excessive criticism or 
abuse of Hitler.
68
  Neville Chamberlain was particularly insistent that foreign policy should 
not be conducted nor presented in ideological terms.  If other countries decided that fascism 
or communism suited their own conditions, ‘I do not see why we should try to impose our 
ideas upon them so long as they do not try to impose their ideas upon us’; it was ‘neither 
useful nor desirable to criticise others because they prefer systems which would not suit us 
but do suit them’.69  The effect was to make anti-fascism less prominent in prime-ministerial 
speeches and party statements than under Baldwin.  The separation of appeasement and 
ideology could get Chamberlain into difficulties.  His defence of the Italian treaty in May 
1938 and attempts to prevent war during the Czechoslovakian crisis led to some Labour 
criticisms that he was ‘a Fascist’, and ‘truckles to the dictators because he likes their 
principles’.70  But Chamberlain’s point was always that foreign fascisms had no claims and 
no place within Britain, and in a low-keyed way his public statements upheld ‘our democratic 
conditions, with their insistence on the supreme value of individual liberty’ and ‘ordered 
constitutional government based on peace, tolerance, moderation and freedom’. When 
accused of fascist sympathies in May 1938, he retorted that fascism and communism alike 
were ‘utterly inconsistent with our democratic notions of equality and liberty’.71  Halifax, his 
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foreign secretary, went further, maintaining a Baldwin-like defence of democracy in moral 
and spiritual terms.
72
   
Appeasement did give succour and encouragement to ‘fellow travellers’ with Nazism.  
But this was not the intention of Chamberlain and his ministers. With the end of appeasement 
in March 1939, ministerial arguments shifted, effortlessly, to the sorts of attack on Nazist 
dictatorship that Baldwin had been conducting since 1933, which Churchill made more 
frequently after the Anschluss in March 1938, and which Halifax intensified after the Munich 
settlement.  The Second World War and more precisely the war crisis and creation of the 
Churchill coalition government in May 1940 made anti-fascism into a central British 
ideology; but the Conservative origins of this lay firmly in the 1930s. 
 
Conclusion 
If British fascism had indigenous sources, the same was still more so of British anti-fascism.  
Resistance to fascism and Nazism had deep and robust resources in British political culture,
73
 
in a parliamentary and historical ideology and in political practices and arguments that 
reached across the main political parties.  From 1918 to 1939 Conservative-dominated 
coalitions or Conservative governments pursued economic and social policies which aimed to 
preserve as much of the established social and political structures as possible against 
challenges from the Labour movement, seeking a stabilisation that mitigated the effects of 
economic depression in ways which weakened all ‘extremist’ political movements.  The 
Conservative party and more particularly the National government provided security against 
radical left governments in ways which contained serious challenge from the ‘right’, and 
insofar as diehards wanted an alternative government they meant a Conservative government 
under different Conservative leadership, not any alliance with the BUF.  Few Conservative 
politicians were involved or interested in pro-fascist organisations, and these were much 
exceeded in number and importance by those Conservatives who participated in cross-party 
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bodies in support of democracy and freedom. In February 1934, for example, John Buchan, 
Lord Cecil and Lord Eustace Percy joined prominent Liberals in signing the ‘Liberty and 
Democratic Leadership’ manifesto.  Baldwin became president, other Conservatives were 
vice-presidents Halifax and Eden gave addresses to, and the Conservative party’s political 
education college was a conference venue for the Association for Education in Citizenship.
74
  
The Conservative party also mounted a defence of parliamentary institutions and ordered 
liberty which, while originally directed against a supposed challenge from the Labour left, 
was re-directed against British and international fascism from 1933 and – given the shared 
ground of parliamentary democracy –  was expressed in similar terms to the anti-fascism of 
the Labour and Liberal parties.  The Conservative party’s contribution to British political, 
economic and ideological conditions made it the chief and most effective obstacle to all 
extremist groups in interwar Britain, with greater importance for the marginalisation of 
fascism than the explicitly ‘anti-fascist’ movements of the political left. 
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